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Abstract
Internet blogs have become an important platform for the discussion of many scientific issues, including climate change.
Blogs, and in particular the comment sections of blogs, also play a major role in the dissemination of contrarian positions that
question mainstream climate science. The effect of this content on people’s attitudes is not fully understood. In particular, it
is unknown how the interaction between the content of blog posts and blog comments affects readers’ attitudes. We report
an experiment that orthogonally varied those two variables using blog posts and comments that either did, or did not, support
the scientific consensus on climate change. We find that beliefs are partially shaped by readers’ perception of how widely
an opinion expressed in a blog post appears to be shared by other readers. The perceived social consensus among readers, in
turn, is determined by whether blog comments endorse or reject the contents of a post. When comments reject the content,
perceived reader consensus is lower than when comments endorse the content. The results underscore the importance of
perceived social consensus on opinion formation.
Keywords Social media · Science communication · Online disinformation · Perceived consensus
Americans are now as likely to resort to the Internet as their
primary source of science information as they are to rely on
television (Su, Akin, Brossard, Scheufele, & Xenos, 2015).
Leading science blogs can attract up to 1.5 million visitors
and several thousand comments every month (Batts, Anthis,
& Smith, 2008). Unlike conventional media, Internet blogs
by design provide a platform for dynamic many-to-one and
many-to-many dialogues: visitors can comment on an article
or video,1 the author of a post can reply to commenters, and
commenters can interact with each other. This multi-layered
1We use the term “blog” as a short-hand for a variety of social media
sites, including for example YouTube, that permit user-generated
content and in particular public comments. Those sites that permit
generation of user content are collectively also known as Web 2.0
(Kata, 2012).
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dynamic has changed the nature of information transfer,
with readers no longer just consuming content passively but
also actively contributing to on-line content.
However, the opportunity for authentic multi-party
debate also opens the door to misleading, offensive, or
inappropriate content. This darker side of blogs is of
particular concern in the scientific arena: in addition to
providing a platform for scientific discussion, Internet
blogs also constitute a staging ground for the denial of
well-established scientific findings (Briones, Nan, Madden,
& Waks, 2012; Kata, 2012; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, &
Gignac, 2013; Lewandowsky et al., 2015; Zimmerman
et al., 2005). To illustrate, Lewandowsky, Ballard, Oberauer,
and Benestad (2016) reported a blind test involving
expert statisticians, who were presented with contrarian
interpretations of climate data that were disguised as
economic variables. The experts found those interpretations,
including samples from contrarian blogs, to be misleading
and inappropriate for policy advice. Similarly, although the
safety and efficacy of childhood vaccinations are not subject
to scientific dispute (van der Linden, Clarke, & Maibach,
2015), up to 71% of content returned by Google in response
to the search term “vaccination” is slanted against the
scientific consensus (Kata, 2010). Much of that contrarian
content arises from blog posts and blog comments (Briones
et al., 2012; Kata, 2012).
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Blog readers therefore operate in a challenging environ-
ment in which they must evaluate the credibility of con-
tent from multiple competing, and often unknown, sources
(Walther & Jang, 2012). Are blog posts trustworthy? Do
comments on blog posts provide corrections of errors or
do they introduce further erroneous content? Can comments
reveal how posts are being received by other readers? Many
of these questions have thus far escaped research atten-
tion, even though the need to examine the role of blog
comments is brought into sharp focus by the prolifera-
tion of “sock puppets”, which are fake online identities
controlled by a small group of operatives that can cre-
ate an illusion of support for, or opposition to, an opinion
(Bu, Xia, & Wang, 2013; Lewandowsky, 2011). During
the U.S. presidential election of 2016, research has iden-
tified a substantial portion of all pro-Trump traffic on
Twitter to have resulted from automated accounts (“tweet-
bots”), with automated pro-Trump traffic being at least
four times as prevalent as automated pro-Clinton traffic
(Kollanyi, Howard, & Woolley, 2016).
This article examines how blog posts and blog comments
interact to affect readers’ attitudes and beliefs concerning
the scientifically well-established finding that greenhouse
gas emissions are warming the Earth, a phenomenon
known as climate change or, more formally, anthropogenic
global warming (AGW). Although there is no notable
scientific dissent from this mainstream position (Cook et
al., 2013, 2016), a sizeable and highly vocal segment of
the public denies those facts for political or ideological
reasons (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013). Blogs
are an integral component of climate-contrarian activities
(Lewandowsky et al. 2013, 2015). Here we focus on how
blogs may affect readers’ attitudes by altering the perceived
prevalence of an opinion among readers. Several lines of
theorizing and a large body of empirical work suggest
that perceived social consensus can be a powerful agent in
shaping and changing people’s attitudes.
Inspired partly by work on collective behavior in non-
human animals (e.g., Galef & Giraldeau, 2001), there has
been much recent research interest in social learning in
humans (e.g., Kendal et al., 2018). A key insight of this
research has been that people are finely attuned to social
cues in their environment. Even very subtle cues, such as
a few people staring at the top of a building in a public
place, can cause others to change their behavior, for example
by following suit and looking up themselves (Gallup et al.,
2012). Similarly, the number of viewers of a YouTube video
can be interpreted as a signal of the prominence of an
issue in the public’s mind (Spartz, Su, Griffin, Brossard, &
Dunwoody, 2017). Given that YouTube views and “likes”
can be purchased in bulk for very little money on the black
market (NATO StratCom COE, 2018), those effects may
give rise to concern.
However, copying others’ behavior is neither universal
nor necessarily always adaptive: Conformity may be
advisable when asocial learning (i.e., individual exploration
and learning directly from the environment) is impossible
or costly, or when people are uncertain about their own
views (Kendal et al., 2018). Under those circumstances,
people tend to copy the behavior or opinion of a majority,
and this tendency increases with the size of the majority
(Muthukrishna & Henrich, 2019). The fact that conformity
increases with the size of the majority is adaptive and
rational because larger groups of independent actors will
provide more reliable information than small groups
(Muthukrishna, Morgan, & Henrich, 2016). When the size
of the majority becomes overwhelming, conformity effects
are also known as “consensus effects.” Much prior work
has focused on how a social consensus can affect opinions
relating to stereotypes and discrimination. For example,
if a participant receives (experimentally manipulated)
information about the predominant attitudes among his or
her peers—viz. how they view minority groups—then the
person’s own attitude tends to shift in the direction of the
purported consensus (Puhl, Schwartz, & Brownell, 2005;
Stangor, Sechrist, & Jost, 2001; Zitek & Hebl, 2007). The
effect is enhanced if the consensus involvesmembers of one’s
in-group, and it can be long-lasting and is detectable outside
the context of the initial manipulation (Stangor et al., 2001).
In the context of scientific issues such as climate
change or vaccinations, providing information about a
consensus among experts has similarly been shown to
nudge people’s attitudes towards the scientific mainstream
(Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 2013; van der Linden,
Leiserowitz, Feinberg, & Maibach, 2015; van der Linden
et al., 2015). Perception of the scientific consensus has been
identified as a “gateway belief”; that is, a crucial conceptual
underpinning of numerous climate-related beliefs (Ding,
Maibach, Zhao, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 2011;
McCright, Dunlap, & Xiao, 2013; Stenhouse et al., 2014;
van der Linden et al., 2015). Conversely, highlighting
of only a few dissenting views on climate change can
undermine the perception of a scientific consensus and
the need for expert guidance during policy development,
even when numeric information about the extent of expert
agreement is available (Koehler, 2016).
It is largely unknown whether anonymous blog com-
ments provide effective social consensus information. We
are aware of only two studies that examined this issue
(Stavrositu & Kim, 2015; Winter & Kra¨mer, 2016), both
of which considered the effect of contrarian comments on
readers’ responses to a scientific post. In both cases, com-
ments that opposed the post decreased the impact of the sci-
entific content by altering the perceived social norm among
readers. Specifically, (Stavrositu & Kim, 2015) presented
participants with a blog post relating to skin cancer, and
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found that behavioral intentions (e.g., to get screened for
skin cancer) were a function of perceived consensual inten-
tions among “other readers”, which in turn were (weakly)
determined by the type of blog comments: When comments
supported the tenor of the post—i.e., medical information
about skin cancer—participants perceived this as indica-
tive of a consensus among readers and reported their own
intentions accordingly. However, when comments were dis-
missive of the content, the perception of a consensus and
behavioral intentions were reduced. Along similar lines,
Winter and Kra¨mer (2016) presented participants with a
blog post that summarized the evidence for the adverse psy-
chological effects of violent video games. The presence of
dissenting comments was found to undermine support for
the evidence presented in the post among participants who
were not vested in the topic.
Taken together, the two studies point to the potentially
corrosive effect of dissenting comments on people’s
perceived reader-consensus and their own attitudes towards
the scientific content. However, neither study manipulated
the content of the blog post that preceded the comments,
leaving open the question of how comments and post
content interact. In particular, it remains unknown whether
the effect of comments can be symmetrical: Can comments
that dissent from a contrarian post, thereby endorsing the
scientific mainstream position, enhance acceptance of the
science in the same way that dissenting comments after a
mainstream post might undermine support for the scientific
position? Accordingly, our study fully crossed the type
of post (endorsing or rejecting the scientific mainstream
position) with the type of comment (endorsing or rejecting
the mainstream). If blog comments shift opinions on post
content by creating a social norm, as suggested by the
results of Stavrositu and Kim (2015) and Winter and
Kra¨mer (2016), then they should exert a symmetrical effect
irrespective of the content of the post.
We adopted this expectation as our working hypothesis in
an experiment that orthogonally combined two types of blog
post (endorsing and rejecting mainstream climate science)
with two types of blog comments (endorsing and rejecting
mainstream climate science). A representative sample of the
American public participated in the experiment online and
responded to questions about the blog post as well as climate
change more generally after they had read both a post and
an accompanying set of comments.
Methods
Design
The experiment featured a 2 × 2 between-participants
design formed by orthogonally combining the type of
blogpost (endorsing or rejecting AGW) and the nature of the
accompanying comments (endorsing or rejecting AGW).
Table 2 lists the test items that were used to form the
dependent variables.
Stimuli
Content was created by the team at the Skeptical Science
blog (www.skepticalscience.com). Two blogposts were
written, one endorsing AGW and the other rejecting AGW.
The post that endorsed AGW summarized the consensual
scientific evidence in lay people’s terms, and the post that
opposed AGW was a concatenation of known contrarian
talking points. For each blogpost, two threads of ten
comments (by ten unique fictitious identities; e.g., “Grand
Poobah”) were created. One thread only featured comments
endorsing AGW and the other thread only contained
comments rejecting AGW. Because incivility is known to
be rife in the blogosphere and is also known to affect
people’s attitudes in various ways (Anderson, Brossard,
Scheufele, Xenos, & Ladwig, 2013; Borah, 2012; Ng &
Detenber, 2005; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011), we controlled
for those effects by ensuring that all posts and comments
conformed to standards of civility. The two posts and their
two streams instantiated the four conditions within the 2 ×
2 design. The full text of the posts and comment streams
are available at https://github.com/StephanLewandowsky/
Blog-comments. Table 1 summarizes readability statistics
for the two posts and the comment streams.
In all conditions, the post was followed by three yes–
no comprehension questions: “The blog post you just read
suggested that the climate has been changing due to changes
in the ocean” (correct for the post rejecting AGW, incorrect
for the post endorsing AGW); “The blog post you just read
suggested that Bono (U2 singer) should have no business
in politics” (always incorrect); and “The blog post you
just read stated that atmospheric CO2 levels have risen
40% since pre-industrial times” (always correct). These
comprehension questions (two of which had to be answered
correctly for a participant to be included in the analysis)
were followed by the comment stream. To mimic the way
in which people likely interact with comments in real-life
situations, we did not constrain participants’ reading time
on the comments.
The comment stream, in turn, was followed by various
test items, which are shown in Table 2 in the order in
which they were presented. (Test items were followed by
questions about age and gender, not shown in the table).
The items queried people’s belief in their susceptibility to
blog comments, their perceived consensus of opinion about
the post among other readers, and their attitudes toward
climate change and the perceived scientific consensus. The
five AGW items (agw1–agw5) and the scientific consensus
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Table 1 Summary statistics for the stimuli used in the experiment
Post Comments
Type of post (TP) Wordcount F-K gradea Flesch easeb Type of comments (TC) Wordcount F-K gradea Flesch easeb
Reject AGW 888 9.4 53.8 Endorse AGW 989 6.6 70.1
Reject AGW 991 6.3 74.2
Endorse AGW 888 9.5 53 Endorse AGW 999 6.6 69.8
Reject AGW 990 6.4 69.7
aF-K grade = Flesch–Kincaid readability index (Kincaid, Fishburne, Rogers, & Chissom, 1975)
bOriginal Flesch readability index (Flesch, 1948)
(SciCons) were taken from Lewandowsky et al. (2013), and
the remaining items were developed for this study.
Participants and procedure
The study was conducted by Qualtrics.com (Provo, Utah),
a firm that specializes in representative Internet surveys,
in 2014 using a contractually agreed sampling plan. The
contract requested a sample of 400 representative U.S.
residents. Participants were members of a completely
bipartisan panel of more than 5.5 million U.S. residents
(as of January 2013), who were invited via propensity
weighting to ensure approximate conformance to the U.S.
Census distribution for age, gender, and region. Participants
were randomly assigned to the four conditions (minimum
N = 91, maximum N = 102). The overall sample size
met the minimum sample size of 200 recommended for
latent variable modeling estimated via maximum-likelihood
(Boomsma & Hoogland, 2001), as well as the sample size
of approximately 400 for expected moderately sized direct
and indirect effects estimated within a mediation analysis
(Wolf, Harrington, Clark, & Miller, 2013).
Only participants who completed all survey items and
who passed at least two out of three comprehension
Table 2 Test items used in all conditions
Short labela Item Response scaleb
Unaffected My opinion about a blog post is completely unaffected by SD to SA
the comments made on the article by others.
ReaderCons Out of every 100 readers of this post, how many do you Slider
think support the basic argument made in this blog post?
Support Overall, I support the basic argument made in this blog post. SD to SA
agw1 I believe that the climate is always changing and what we SD to SA
are currently observing is just natural fluctuation. (R)
agw2 I believe that most of the warming over the last 50 years is SD to SA
due to the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations.
agw3 I believe that the burning of fossil fuels over the last 50 years SD to SA
has caused serious damage to the planet’s climate.
agw4 Human CO2 emissions cause climate change. SD to SA
agw5 Humans are too insignificant to have an appreciable impact SD to SA
on global temperature. (R)
SciCons On a scale from 0% to 100%, in your opinion, how many Slider
climate scientists agree that human activity is causing global warming?
aLabels are provided for items that are entered into the final analysis and are used in the figures
bSlider = respondents used a slider with end points 0 and 100 to enter a number; SD to SA = 5-point scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly
Agree (5), with a Neutral (3) response option. Items marked with “(R)” were reverse-scored
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questions after reading the blog post were included in the
sample. Participants were compensated by Qualtrics with
cash-equivalent points.
After providing informed consent, participants read
the blogpost and comment stream as appropriate for the
condition to which they were assigned and then responded
to all test items. Participants who were exposed to the
posts rejecting AGW received an additional debriefing
after completing the test items that corrected the erroneous
information that had been imparted in the blog post.
Debriefing in those conditions was in turn followed by a few
further test items that formed part of a different experiment
and are not reported here.
Results
Data preprocessing
The data set delivered by Qualtrics contained completed
records from 403 participants, ten of whom did not meet the
criterion of passing at least two out of three comprehension
questions. Those records were eliminated, yielding a final
sample of 393 participants for analysis (198 male, 195
female). The mean age of the sample was 46 (median = 45,
Q1 = 29, Q3 = 60).2 The data set is available at https://
github.com/StephanLewandowsky/Blog-comments.
We next considered the time participants spent on reading
the comments. Reading time for the comments varied
considerably across participants, from 2.5 s to 4530 s (1 h
15 min). Jackson and McClelland (1979) reported adult
reading speed estimates for college-level text that ranged
from 33 words per minute (wpm) to 454 wpm. Those
estimates translate into expected reading times ranging from
around 130 s to 1800 s for the roughly 1000 words in our
comment stream. Given that our comments were written
in a colloquial style that would likely be easier to process
than the texts used by Jackson and McClelland (1979),
we decided to define “careful readers” as anyone who
spent between 100 s and 1800 s processing the comments.
All further analyses were conducted both on the full set
of participants who passed the comprehension questions
(N = 393) and a subset of careful readers (N = 183).
With two exceptions noted below, the two analyses yielded
qualitatively identical results except that all effects were
more pronounced with the subset of careful readers. We
therefore only report the analyses of the full sample.
2Age was self-reported using a slider with end points 15 and 100.
The minimum reported age was 18 and the maximum 100, with eight
participants reporting an age above 90. Because all participants passed
the a priori comprehension criterion, these observations were retained
for analysis.
Tests of experimental effects
The five items probing climate attitudes were reverse-
scored as appropriate (see Table 2 for a description of
all items) and then averaged to form a single composite
score, called AGW in the figures, that was used for the
descriptive statistics. Figure 1 shows summary statistics
and distributional information for all dependent variables
across the four cells of the experimental design (panels
a–e), and pairwise correlations between perceived reader
consensus and acceptance of AGW for the four cells
separately (panel f). Table 3 shows the cell means for the
same set of dependent variables. Skewness and kurtosis for
all measures were within ±1 and there were no particularly
outlying observations based on the interquartile range
outlier detection rule (Hoaglin & Iglewicz, 1987).
The variables in Fig. 1 and Table 3 were analyzed
by frequentist as well as Bayesian techniques. We report
the Bayesian analysis in the Appendix; here we present
a series of 2 × 2 ANOVAs that explored the pattern in
Fig. 1. Except where noted, the Bayesian analysis supported
identical conclusions. For the item querying whether readers
felt they were affected by blog comments (item Unaffected
in Table 2), no effects reached significance, all F < 1. The
overall mean of this item also did not differ from the mid-
point of the scale (M = 3.02, t (392) < 1), suggesting that
participants were ambivalent about whether or not they were
affected by others’ views and this ambivalence was invariant
across all conditions.
People’s support for the blog post (item Support) was
not affected by the type of post, F(1, 389) < 1, or
the type of comments, F(1, 389) < 1, although there
was strong evidence for the interaction of both variables,
F(1, 389) = 10.75, p < 0.001, partial η2 = .027,
Cohen’s F = .166. This reflected the fact that when
the post and comments were of the same type (both
rejecting or both endorsing AGW), people supported the
post more than when the polarities of the post and the
comments were in opposition. This result establishes that
reading the comments affected people’s views of the post.
Supportive comments enhanced endorsement of the post
whereas critical comments undermined that support.
The AGW composite score was similarly unaffected by
the type of comments, F(1, 389) = 1.59, p > 0.1, although
there was very strong evidence of a role of the type of
post, F(1, 389) = 14.28, p < 0.0001, partial η2 = .035,
Cohen’s F = .192, indicating that people accepted global
warming more after reading the post supporting mainstream
science than after reading a contrarian post. The interaction
between the two variables was non-significant, F(1, 389) =
1.42, p > 0.1. In this instance, however, the subset analysis
of careful readers additionally returned a main effect of type
of comment, F(1, 179) = 6.58, p < 0.02, reflecting the
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Fig. 1 Summary statistics and distributional information for all depen-
dent variables (see Table 2) across the four cells of the experimental
design. Bars represent cell means and error bars are 95% bootstrapped
(N = 1,000 samples) confidence intervals. Data points within vio-
lin plots are jittered to avoid over-printing. a Unaffected; b Support;
c AGW, which is average of responses to items agw1, agw2, agw3,
agw4, and agw5 after reverse scoring; d ReaderCons; e SciCons;
f pairwise correlations between AGW and ReaderCons for all four
conditions. The consensus items (ReaderCons and SciCons) use a per-
centage scale (0–100) and all other items use a five-point scale from
“Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.” See Table 2 for wording of
the test items
fact that contrarian comments reduced acceptance of the
mainstream science among careful readers.
The perceived consensus among blog readers (item
ReaderCons) was affected neither by the type of post,
F(1, 389) < 1, nor the type of comments, F(1, 389) <
1, but it was strongly affected by the interaction of
both variables, F(1, 389) = 50.44, p < 0.0001, partial
η2 = .115, Cohen’s F = .360. That is, similar
to people’s expressed support for the blog post, their
perception of consensus among readers was greatest when
the comments were consonant with the post (both rejecting
or both endorsing AGW) as opposed to when there was
a mismatch in polarity. The subset analysis of careful
readers additionally returned a main effect of type of post,
F(1, 179) = 5.80, p < 0.02, reflecting the fact that more
readers were presumed to endorse the science-based post
than its contrarian counterpart.
For the presumed consensus among scientists (item
SciCons), by contrast, what mattered strongly was the type
of post, F(1, 388) = 12.96, p < 0.0003, partial η2 = .032,
Cohen’s F = .183,3 reflecting the fact that the science-
based post underscored the scientific consensus whereas
3This variable had one missing observation, which explains why the
denominator df are different from all the others for this test.
the contrarian post undermined it. A weak effect for the
type of comments, F(1, 388) = 4.56, p < 0.05, partial
η2 = .012, Cohen’s F = .108, was not confirmed by the
Bayesian analysis (see Appendix). The interaction between
both variables was non-significant, F(1, 388) < 1.
Taken together, the analyses support two main conclu-
sions: First, the type of post strongly affected people’s
attitudes towards climate change, with the science-based
post increasing belief in global warming relative to a
contrarian post. By contrast, there was no evidence that
comments alone affected attitudes towards climate change
directly when all participants were considered. Only when
we focused on careful readers did a direct effect of com-
ments on climate attitudes emerge, such that comments that
endorsed the science were associated with higher accep-
tance than contrarian comments.
Second, the match or mismatch between post and
comments mattered to people’s endorsement of the post and
the perceived consensus among readers: critical comments
(e.g., contrarian comments following a science-based post
or vice versa) undermined support and perceived consensus,
whereas favorable comments increased both. In light of the
strong effects of comments on perceived consensus among
readers, and in light of the direct effect on attitudes among
careful readers, we next explored the possibility that reader
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Table 3 Means of principal dependent measures across experimental conditions
Type of post Type of comments Unaffecteda ReaderConsa Supporta AGWa SciConsa
Reject AGW Endorse AGW 2.97 47.8 3.10 3.19 58.5
Reject AGW 3.06 63.5 3.46 2.99 52.3
Endorse AGW Endorse AGW 3.08 64.7 3.44 3.41 66.5
Reject AGW 2.98 48.1 3.05 3.40 62.1
aSee Table 2 for explanation of variable names
comments may affect AGW attitudes indirectly, via their
effect on consensus.
Inter-variable associations and structural equation
modeling
This analysis modeled people’s acceptance of AGW as
a function of the two experimental design variables and
perceived endorsement among readers. We applied process
analysis (Hayes, 2018) to model the relation between
those intertwined variables. We first devised a measurement
model associated with the five items that queried climate
attitudes (items agw1 though agw5). The single-factor
model associated with an AGW latent variable was found
to be moderately well-fitting, χ2(5) = 66.64, p < 0.001,
CFI = .910, T LI = .821, RMSEA= .177, SRMR=
.069. However, there was an indication that a non-negligible
amount of covariance was shared between the two items
with negative polarity, agw1 and agw5 (see Table 2). With
the addition of the covariance between these two items (r =
.40, p < 0.001), the model fit substantially better, χ2(4) =
6.39, p > 0.1, CFI = .997, T LI = .991, RMSEA=
.039, SRMR= .017. We therefore used this single-factor
latent variable as our criterion variable for the remaining
modeling.
We next examined some of the key bivariate correlations.
The association between perceived scientific consensus
(SciCons) and the AGW latent variable was large, r =
.59, 95%CI : .51, .66, p < 0.0001. By contrast, the
overall correlation between perceived consensus among
readers (ReaderCons) and the AGW latent variable escaped
significance, r = .10, 95%CI : −.03, .22, p >
0.05. The overall absence of a correlation is unsurprising
in light of the opposing directions of the relationship
between reader consensus and endorsement of AGW across
conditions (shown in panel f in Fig. 1). For the posts that
rejected science, the correlations between perceived reader
consensus and the AGW latent variables were negative/near
zero (r = −.16 and r = .05), whereas they were positive for
the posts that endorsed the mainstream scientific position
(r = .45 and r = .25). The reversed directionality
between types of post points to a coherent role of the
presumed prevalence among readers of support for the
scientific position. That is, a negative correlation between
the presumed share of readers who endorsed a rejectionist
post is equivalent to a positive association between the
share of readers who disagreed with that post and, by
implication, endorsed the mainstream scientific position.
Thus, to simplify presentation of the results, the perceived
reader consensus scores provided by participants who were
exposed to the rejectionist post were therefore reflected to
express dissensus with the post (i.e., 100 - ReaderCons
score). This reflected score represented the perceived
endorsement of mainstream science among readers. This
reflected measure behaved consistently across conditions
was found to correlate moderately with AGW across all
conditions, r = .25, 95%CI : .12, .37, p < 0.0001.
Finally, we estimated the correlations between the two
experimental variables, type of post and type of comments,
and the AGW latent variable. For both experimental vari-
ables, endorsement of AGW was coded as 1 and rejection
as 0. The correlations were r = .18, 95%CI : .07, .27,
p < 0.003 for type of post, and r = .04, 95%CI :
−.08, .15, p = 0.520 for type of comments, respectively.
Those correlations mirror the ANOVAs reported in the pre-
vious section, and they confirm that there was no direct (or
total) effect between one of the key experimental variables,
type of comments, and AGW. However, contemporary pro-
cess analysis does not require the presence of a significant
total effect, as the observation of an indirect effect by
itself is considered sufficient (Hayes, 2009; Preacher &
Hayes, 2004; Mathieu & Taylor, 2006; MacKinnon, Krull,
& Lockwood, 2000). We therefore explored several candi-
date process models to explore whether the type of comment
may still affect AGW attitudes via an indirect route.
The first model is shown in Fig. 2. Both experimental
variables and their interaction were used to predict AGW
directly and indirectly, via the presumed mediator of
reflected perceived reader consensus. This model was found
to fit acceptably well, χ2(20) = 51.28, p < 0.001,
CFI = .975, T LI = .955, RMSEA = .063, SRMR
= .049. However, several of the estimated effects were
not statistically significant (indicated by dashed lines in
the figure). In particular, the interaction between the two
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Fig. 2 Mediation model with
AGW regressed upon the
experimental variables type of
post (TP), type of comments
(TC), and a TP × TC interaction
term (TP*TC). The reflected
perceived reader consensus
score (abbreviated to refRCons)
is the hypothesized mediator.
Significant weights and
correlations are indicated by
solid lines and non-significant
weights and correlations by
dashed lines
experimental variables, type of post and type of comments
(TP × TC), was not associated with either a direct (b =
−.16, β = −.11, p = 0.22) or indirect (b = .01, β =
.01, p = 0.79) effect on AGW. Furthermore, the type of
comments (TC) did not have a direct effect on AGW (b =
.04, β = .03, p = 0.75).
Consequently, a revised and simplified process model
was estimated which excluded the interaction term between
the experimental variables, as well as the direct effect of
type of comment on AGW. The revised model is shown in
Fig. 3 and was found to be associated with acceptable levels
of model fit, χ2(17) = 45.93, p < 0.001, CFI = .964,
T LI = .941, RMSEA = .066, SRMR = .052. All weights
and correlations shown in the figure are significant. It can
be seen that the type of post (TP) had a direct effect on
AGW (b = .16, β = .13, p = 0.007). Thus, exposure
to the scientific post was associated with greater levels of
acceptance of the mainstream science, as already indicated
by the corresponding main effect in the earlier ANOVA. A
corresponding direct effect for type of comments (TC) was
absent. However, both types of post, b = .07, β = .05, p =
0.002, and type of comment, b = .09, β = .07, p =
0.001, had indirect effects on AGW via the reflected reader
consensus score. Thus, people’s acceptance of mainstream
science was in part determined by their perception of how
many other readers shared their view, and that perception in
turn was influenced by our experimental design variables,
namely the type of post and type of comments. The multiple
R associated with the model was .280 (p = 0.004). Thus,
7.7% of the AGW true score variance was accounted for by
the direct effect of the type of comment variable and the
indirect effects of both experimental variables.
Fig. 3 Final process model with
completely standardized effects.
AGW is regressed upon the
experimental variables Type of
Post (TP) and Type of
Comments (TC). The reflected
perceived reader consensus
score (abbreviated to refRCons)
serves as mediator. Only
significant weights and
correlations are shown
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Discussion
Our results are readily summarized: (a) We observed sym-
metrical effects of blog comments on readers’ endorsement
of the post, such that whenever the comments agreed with
the post, participants supported the argument in the post
more, irrespective of its content. (b) The same pattern was
obtained for the perceived consensus among readers. (c)
Concerning attitudes towards AGW, comments had a direct
effect only with careful readers but not the full sample. (d)
The extent to which comments provided information about
a consensual endorsement of AGW among other readers
indirectly determined participants’ attitudes towards AGW.
Reports of indirect effects in the absence of total effects are
not uncommon; see, e.g., Kohen, Leventhal, Dahinten, &
McIntosh, 2008, Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Weber,
2003.
Although our indirect effect was small in absolute
magnitude, it may be of some practical significance when
it is scaled up to the number of readers of scientific blogs
(for other examples of the relevance of seemingly small
effects, see Kahan & Braman, 2003). Specifically, the
observed difference in perceived reader consensus between
the two comment conditions involving the mainstream
scientific post can be converted into the expected change
in AGW acceptance based on the model in Fig. 3. When
this is done, contrarian comments are associated with a
decline in acceptance of AGW by .13 on the items’ five-
point scale.4 Given that 13.5% of our sample scored 3 on
the AGW items, representing exact neutrality or complete
indifference, the contrarian comments may suffice to nudge
those respondents off the fence and towards rejection (i.e.,
a score below 3). Scaling up this effect to an audience of
1.5 million of popular blogs (Batts et al., 2008), our results
suggest that a large number of readers may be nudged
towards rejection of climate science if they encounter a
stream consisting of contrarian comments.
The potential societal significance of comments appears
particularly disproportionate in light of the minute fraction
of readers who write comments. To illustrate, only .06%
of users of National Public Radio (NPR) in the U.S. were
estimated to leave comments (Jensen, 2016).
The fact that a small fraction of readers who leave
comments—some of whom may even be “sock puppets”
4The difference in perceived consensus between the two types of
comments is 16.64, which translates into .74 of a standard deviation.
The correlation between refReadCons and AGW was r = .19,
implying that a 1 SD decrease in perceived consensus corresponded to
a .19 SD decrease in AGW. Given that the standard deviation of AGW
across all participants was .87, the expected shift downward in AGW
acceptance as a function of contrarian comments was .74 × .19 × .87,
or .13 on the 5-point scale.
(Bu et al., 2013; Lewandowsky, 2011)—can leverage
public opinion about scientific issues must be of con-
cern. This concern appears widely shared among Internet
news services, although there is disagreement about the
appropriate response. One response has been to discon-
tinue commenting facilities altogether. Several large online
news services have taken this step, including NPR (Jensen,
2016), Popular Science (http://www.popsci.com/), and
Vice news (https://www.vice.com). Users can now also
download a browser add-on that automatically shuts out
comments unless explicitly enabled by the user (https://
rickyromero.com/shutup/). Other alternatives include
strict moderation of comments, as for example trialed
by the online newspaper TheConversation.com. which
has entertained options such as a “community coun-
cil” to provide moderation (https://theconversation.com/
involving-a-community-council-in-moderation-25547).
A further alternative that is being explored by a Nor-
wegian site is the requirement that readers must pass a
brief comprehension quiz before being permitted to post
comments (http://www.niemanlab.org/2017/03/this-site-is-
taking-the-edge-off-rant-mode-by-making-readers-pass-a-
quiz-before-commenting/).
Turning to theoretical implications, we have framed our
study and results in terms of the importance of the perceived
consensus on attitudes towards scientific issues. There is
growing evidence that knowledge of the overwhelming
scientific consensus on climate change can shift people’s
AGW attitudes (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016; Harris,
Sildma¨e, Speekenbrink, & Hahn, 2018; Lewandowsky
et al., 2013; van der Linden et al., 2015; van der Linden,
Leiserowitz, & Maibach, 2018). Likewise, knowledge of
the consensus among medical scientists about the efficacy
of vaccinations has been shown to increase public support
for vaccines, and concomitantly reduce concern about their
safety (van der Linden et al., 2015). Our results are fully
consonant with those findings but additionally extend the
importance of perceived consensus to other sources, in this
case anonymous other readers of blogs. Our result meshes
well with a recent study by Harris et al. (2018), who
examined the efficacy of various consensus-based messages
on shifting people’s attitudes towards climate change. One
of their studies used an American online sample and is
thus comparable to the present experiment. Harris et al.
found that the most effective way to communicate the
scientific consensus was by “experiencing” it—that is, by
being exposed to individual opinions from a number of
scientists—as opposed to being given a summary statistic
(e.g., “97 out of 100 scientists agree on AGW”). Their
results confirm the power of experiential exposure to
opinions; we extend those results by showing that even
anonymous voices with unknown expertise can shape
people’s experience of an opinion-relevant consensus.
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There are, however, other theoretical frameworks that
could be applied to the present results. For example,
Walther, Woo Jang, and Edwards (2018) examined the
effects of user-generated online health advice within the
heuristic–systematic model of social influence (Chaiken,
1980) and warranting theory (Walther, Heide, Hamel, &
Shulman, 2009). Those models present a more nuanced
and complex route to social influence; however, both
subsume heuristics such as the effects of consensus
explored here. Thus, within the heuristic-systematic model,
a perceived consensus might trigger attitude change based
on a “consensus implies correctness” heuristic (Todorov,
Chaiken, & Henderson, 2002). Within warrant theory,
the presence of multiple seemingly independent sources
can likewise provide epistemic warrant for the shared
underlying opinion that is being articulated (Walther et al.,
2018). Our results do not differentiate between those
nuanced theoretical positions.
We conclude by highlighting several open questions for
researchers that our results helped bring into focus. First,
how much dissent in a comment stream is required to
disrupt the perception of a widespread consensus? Our
streams were uniform in their orientation towards one
position or the other, but in reality this rarely occurs.
Might a single deviating comment be sufficient to disrupt
consensus perception, as is suggested by the results
of Koehler (2016) in a simulated “journalistic-balance”
environment? Or might a pervasive consensus be perceived
even when the share of supporting comments is at only
70%, as is suggested by some quantitative models of social
influence (Muthukrishna et al., 2016; Muthukrishna &
Henrich, 2019)? Second, can the effects of comments be
moderated by information about hidden base rates (e.g.,
how many readers did the post have, relative to the number
of comments; what was the proportion of “likes” and
“dislikes” among readers who did not comment?). Third,
to what extent do the self-report measures explored here
translate into actual political behaviors, such as increased
climate activism or disengagement with the issue. In light
of current concerns about the erosion of truthful public and
political discourse (Lewandowsky, Ecker, & Cook, 2017;
Lewandowsky, Cook, & Ecker, 2017), those questions await
urgent exploration.
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Appendix A: Bayesian analysis
We used the BayesFactor package for R (Morey, 2015)
with the “bottom” option, which adds single effects one at
a time in comparison to the null model. The BayesFactor
package calculates the Bayes factor (BF) for pairwise
model comparisons, using default priors on the effect
sizes included in a model (Rouder, Morey, Speckman, &
Province, 2012). The BF reflects the relative strength of
evidence for one model over the other that is provided by
the data, independent of the researcher’s prior beliefs. Bayes
factors quantify the strength of evidence on a continuous
scale, and unlike with p values, there is no conventional cut-
off. A BF equal to 1 reflects complete ambiguity in which
the evidence favors both models equally; BFs between 1 and
3 are considered weak evidence, BFs between 3 and 10 as
intermediate, BF > 10 as strong evidence, and BF > 100
as decisive evidence in favor of one model against the other
(Kass & Raftery, 1995). When the BF falls below one, its
reciprocal can be interpreted in the same manner but with
reverse polarity—that is, a Bayes Factor of 0.1 for a given
model is actually strong evidence (1/0.1 = 10) against it
(and in favor of the other model).
The Bayesian analyses on the full sample of participants
largely paralleled the results of the frequentist analysis.
For the Unaffected item, there was no evidence for the
inclusion of either main effect or the interaction compared
to a null model with the grand mean only; largest BF= 0.15.
People’s support for the blog post (item Support) was not
affected by the type of post (BF = 0.11) or the type of com-
ments (BF = 0.11), although there was strong evidence for
the interaction of both variables (BF = 19.04). The AGW
composite score was unaffected by the type of comments
(BF = 0.21) or the interaction (BF = 0.19), although there
was very strong evidence of a role of the type of post (BF =
80.74).
For the two consensus items, the perceived consensus
among blog readers was affected neither by the type of post
(BF = 0.12) nor the type of comments (BF = 0.12), but it
was decisively affected by the interaction of both variables
(BF = 1.50 ×108). For the presumed consensus among
scientists (SciCons), by contrast, what mattered strongly
was the type of post (BF = 42.84) but not the comments (BF
= 0.11) or the interaction (BF = 0.79).
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